Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s greatest regret in his second term thus far has been embracing clan militia (Macawislaay) relegating Somali National Army (SNA) to an afterthought. The decision effectively disbanded SNA.
When Mohamud announced intensified fighting against Al Shabaab, the country was hungry for a unifying symbol. SNA presented him with a prime opportunity.
Mohamud Squandered the opportunity. He rarely discussed SNA efforts and challenges in Mudug, Galgaduud, Hiiraan, and Lower Shabelle.
He has made no public effort to repatriate the 5,000 cadets in Eretria. The cadets have completed training but there is no plan to bring them home and have them join the fighting.
Further, Mohamud and his lieutenants are in quest of eliminating leading voices championing building a professional army. Removal and dismissal had been concentrated on low public profile career personnel in the security sector.
Director General for the Minister of Defense Hassan M. Said Samantar was recently pushed out. Samatar was the leading architect of the transition plan to hand over security from the African Transition Mission in Somalia(ATMIS) to SNA.
General Abdi Egal Duale, the commander of the 21st Division based in Dhuusamareeb is reportedly hanging on by a thin thread. Egal championed professionalizing the army and opposed infusing clan sentiments into war operations.
Some with high public profiles either had been killed in suspicious circumstances or had been heavily constrained. Since Mohamud and his lieutenants unveiled a flawed war strategy, army officers have been overruled by clan leaders on the battlefield.
There had not been a thorough investigation of General Farhan Mohamud Adan (Qaroole) death. A few days later, the elite paramilitary group Qaroole led lost additional 11 up-and-coming officers. They had been no accountability for the gross incompetence that led to this massacre.
General Odawaa Yusuf Rage, the army chief of staff, abandoned several operations after he was overruled by clan leaders in the effort to capture El Bur. Odawaa reportedly survived multiple assassination attempts including a grenade attack.
Dozens of other officers at the colonel level and below with lesser public profiles had been dismissed without any documentation. Many more are reporting unpaid allowances including food rations for family members.
Instead of addressing SNA trials and tribulations, Mohamud and his lieutenants gushingly speak about Macawislaay. Mohamud is attracted to Macawislaay because there is no direct cost associated. He is on record stating Macawislay fight during the day and eat boiled beans at night paid for by their parents.
With this type of rhetoric, Mohamud wasted a golden opportunity. He could of rally the country around small but determined young men and women who wear a blue flag with a five corners single star insignia on their shoulders.
Members of SNA come from every clan and every corner of the country. Many are young and idealists specially Gorgor units trained by Turkey.
Turkey put members of Gorgor in the same training regiments as its own North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member troops. One of the key pillars of NATO-centered training is professionalism.
A professional army member is drilled with a set of values. The centre of that value is competence and expertise at a specific job within the unit. The expectation is that a member accomplishes a certain level of expertise in the assigned job.
For example, an army intelligence officer’s job is to ensure his or her unit has the best possible intel for the mission. In Somalia, that may include in-depth knowledge of people and trails of the battlefield.
Those who often defend injecting clannish culture into what is supposed to be a professional army retort to the local knowledge that a member of the ragtag clan militia may possess. That might be valid, but it is the job of a professional intelligent army officer to become an expert in the local populace and be as good as locals if not better.
Mission based on a job description and a sub-specialization is critical in the NATO training manual. There are young men trained this way in Gorgor.
A high-level performance on the battlefield requires good morale and determination to succeed. The Political leadership of the country critically influences army morale.
The first task of political leadership when sending men to battle is to give them an absolute crystal-clear mission definition including success criteria. The second is to ensure army effort and performance are promoted and celebrated. Mohamud has done none of these.
One thing Mohamud should have done before intensifying fighting in the country is to announce salary and food ration increases for members of SNA. He should repeat this as frequently as possible.
The country should have been asked to make sacrifices for the war effort. Those who have done well economically should be asked to make a significant contribution.
For instance, Mohamud should urge hospitals to treat wounded SNA as part of a contribution from the private sector to increase the quality of care and increase the chances of wounded soldiers returning to the battlefield.
These kinds of policies will encourage young men on the frontline to fight harder. It will demonstrate a political leadership committed to the mission and well-being of those executing it as well as their loved ones.
On the contrary, Mohamud is engaged in budgetary gimmicks with the army. Villa Somalia has issued three announcements reducing benefits for the security sector. The latest one reduced food rations for service members’ families.
Mohamud should reverse directions by flooding the airwaves and visiting the homes of fallen ordinary soldiers. Imagine images of him visiting a Somali mother who lost her son in a small shed and presenting her with the Somali flag.
At a minimum, it will inspire other young men that there is something bigger than their clan to fight for. That there is a national identity to fight for and die for.
The clans that Hussein Sheikh-Ali described as the “coalition of the willing” became suspicious of each other to no surprise. Some have long-time riffs and went the opposite direction.
Mohamud still has an opportunity to change course and rectify the problem. The first step is to acknowledge it and bring new advisors and lieutenants to formulate a new strategy. The likes of Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, Mahad Mohamed Salad, and Hussein Sheikh-Ali are failing him.
Mohamud’s blind group loyalty to these men is failing the nation. The greatest point of failure when history is written about his return to Villa Somalia is expected to be embracing Macawislaay which effectively disbanded the army.
Author is a Technology Entrepreneur and long-time civic leader. He tweets @fuguni. Follow him for more in-depth analysis.
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