Ardent supporters of Somalia President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud found an epiphany and suddenly fell in love with the Somali National Army (SNA). Mohamud infused clan politics into SNA and embarked on a process of ending five years of professional troops build up.
Mohamud started the process of dismantling SNA as soon as he returned to power on May 15th, 2022. The main method of his destruction has been transforming professional soldiers into clan militias. Mohamud’s supporters blindly cheered him on. Some chose silence.
The critical question is what changed for these folks 15 months later? An enlightenment to the value of professional army is not the reason.
Every thoughtful and sensible Somali urged them to speak up against Mohamud’s order of mingling SNA and clan militia. The decision was tactically catastrophic. But more importantly, it showed Mohamud had no national strategy or plan to galvanize the nation for a war against one of the most brutal terror organizations operating today.
Al Shabaab has embedded itself into Somali society. The struggle against the group is closer to law enforcement than conventional war. This alone requires a carefully considered strategy centered at solid intelligence and change of political culture.
Mohamud adopted neither a law enforcement nor a military approach. He gravitated towards clan structure and transformed a small but highly capable SNA into clan militia.
Clan affiliation overrode all the training and national value instilled in professional soldiers. Many young SNA members became dilutional with Mohamud’s leadership. Some have confided with their families about their frustration. Others took to social media and chronicled their experiences.
Moreover, some of SNA meager resources were diverted to clan militias with direct ties to Al Shabaab. Some of the arms and ammunitions distributed to clan militia ended up being used to kill SNA.
Nearly one year and a half later, thousands of SNA members had been killed. Some units were completely wiped out in grotesque fashion after running out of ammunition and fuel in rural areas.
On August 26, 2023, Al Shabaab killed an estimate of over 200 troops in Cowsweyne, Galgadud. The battalion commander warned about running out of ammunition, food and fuel days before the gruesome event. Mohamud replaced the commander instead of delivering the requested supplies.
Some of the SNA members who survived the initial attack fled but ran out of fuel 13 miles from Cowsweyne. Al Shabaab tracked them down and grotesquely slaughtered them.
A few days later, it became clear no one tried to send fuel to SNA in Cawswayne. Instead, fuel was stollen and profited from twice with over-inflated prices. Government accounts were invoiced first at heavy markups then the entire fuel was resold in the open market. The culprit is a recently formed vendor controlled by Mohamud’s close political confidants.
Healthcare treatment for wounded SNA is non-existent. Many SNA members had been wounded and became permanently disabled. Often, only SNA members from families with means can afford any sort of treatment. The rest die from sustained wounds or painfully heal untreated.
Many members of SNA had been so discouraged by the widespread corruption under Mohamud’s leadership. Some have deserted the service altogether.
Some resorted to extraordinary measures to survive. The recent mutiny in eastern Galgaduud where SNA vacated areas previously reclaimed from Al Shabaab is the latest example.
Many of these catastrophic events were avoidable. Mohamud’s widespread corruption and inclination for politics based on clan structure are the main root causes.
Mohamud’s greatest demon has been an inclination to think within clan lines. After all, he proposed using clan structure to resurrect the Somali Republic in a thesis for a fulfillment for a college degree. This wrong thinking led him to stray both of his terms.
The type of close confidants and advisors he selected reinforced Mohamud’s political demons. The backgrounds of three close aids provide some clairvoyance.
Ahmed Moalim Fiqi, the current Interior Minister, cut his political teeth in the Somali civil war of the 1990s. Fiqi’s guiding political principle is to crush and conquer other clans.
Fiqi was one of the early adopters of the erroneous concept that the only way to defeat Al Shabaab was to build a war plan around clans. This is despite the fact the concept miserably failed when Somalia descended into civil war in 1991.
The main reason Somalia clan politics is a failure is that it unpeels like an onion. Any subclan subdivides into more subclans each with different demands and political grievances. At the end of the unpeeling process, there is not much of community left alone a nation.
Another close confidant who reinforces Mohamud’s erroneous political philosophy is the National Security Advisor. Hussein Sheikh-Ali. Sheikh-Ali briefly held the position in the previous regime but was fired after information emerged that he was spying for foreign intelligence agencies.
Sheikh-Ali amplified a false narrative that there was a widespread clan uprising in Hiiraan, Galgaduud, Mudug, and Middle Shabelle against Al Shabaab. The assertion was false. There were only a few pockets of revolt in Hiiraan.
Sheikh-Ali grossly and irresponsibly exaggerated the level of uprising. Nevertheless, it was music to Mohamud’s ears.
Mohamud ordered senior officers of SNA to join their perspective sub-clan militias to lend military expertise based on Sheikh-Ali’s faulty assessment. The order caused professionally trained officers to become subservient to clan militia leaders without training or discipline.
The order was equivalent to Omer Carte Qalib decision to dissolve SNA in 1991. Mohamud’s order was the second dissolution of SNA.
Hussein disguised the flawed order in waterfall project management jargon. Phases were set without a reasonable schedule, required resources and associated risks typically found in project management textbooks. In addition to widespread malfeasants, lack of adequate analysis of required resources and associated risks is major contributing factor SNA units are running out of ammunition and fuel in rural areas.
Appointing Mahad Mohamed Salad to the head of National Intelligence was another of Mohamud’s early appointments. Salad has a similar background to Fiqi and has used violent clan politics to earn a position in Mohamud’s political orbit.
One of Salad’s first accomplishments was to drive out professional spy agents and replace them with close relatives. The top 8 posts are occupied by Salad’s unqualified clan loyalists.
Since Mohamud declared ‘total war’ on Al Shabaab, there have been at least 15 complex attacks on SNA bases in which the terror group killed scores of soldiers and captured significant quantities of war equipment. The terror group had better intelligence than SNA in each episode.
On some occasions, Al Shabaab had the plate numbers of SNA vehicles fitted with Global Positioning System (GPS) before the attacks. Al Shabaab intentionally burned those vehicles fearful of Drones tracking them down.
SNA has been inflicted with irreversible damage by Mohamud’s clannish approach to fighting terrorism. Mohamud can stop the gushing blood of SNA and go back to the drawing board, starting with firing a trio of confidants.
The best way to support the remaining units of SNA is to pause and reevaluate. The least Mohamud’s ardent supporters who suddenly found an epiphany of love with SNA should do is to urge him to heed changes that could help avoid future unnecessary casualties.
Anything short of returning to the drawing board and starting with the firing of the confidants listed above is meaningless. Thus, the sudden epiphany is insincere, and no one should be deceived.
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Author is a Technology Entrepreneur and long time civic leader. Follow him @fuguni.
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